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THE DUTY OF THE FAVORED DRIVER UNDER THE
RIGHT OF WAY STATUTE TO MAINTAIN A
REASONABLE AND PROPER LOOKOUT
JAMES P. McATEER

What duty is imposed on the favored driver at an intersection under
the current right of way statute?' The right of way given is not absolute;' the court has said that "the duty to avoid . . . collisions ...
rests on both drivers... [though] ... the primary duty.., rests with
the driver on the left."8 It is clear that speeding or lack of control on
the part of the favored driver will bar his recovery if it contributes to
the collision.
Must the favored driver keep a lookout to the left? The court evaded
the issue in the case of Massengale v. Svangren.' In that case two cars
were approaching an intersection at approximately the same time and
at approximately the same speed, 30 miles per hour. Neither driver
saw the other until it was too late to avoid the collision. The majority
of the court preferred to place its finding on the ground that since the
favored driver "had the right to assume" that the disfavored driver
would observe him and yield the right of way, the favored driver's
failure to look until too late could not be a proximate cause of the
collision.' The opinion refused to "decide whether the favored driver
had a duty to look to his left."'
The principal problem in the Massengale case, and in similar cases
involving the standard of care of the favored driver, is the problem
inherent in the right to assume that the disfavored driver will yield the
right of way.
IRCW 46.60.150 RIGHT OF WAY ON APPROACHING INTERSECTIONs. Every operator
of a vehicle on approaching public highway intersections shall look out for and give
right of way to vehicles on his right, simultaneously approaching a given point within
the intersection, and whether his vehicle first reaches and enters the intersection or
not; Provided, That this section shall not apply to operators on arterial highways.
For a discussion of the position of the disfavored driver, see Huston, Contributory
Negligence of the Difavored Driver under the Right of Way Statute, 26 WASH. L.
Rzv. 30 (1951).
2 McHugh v. Mason, 154 Wash. 572, 283 Pac. 184 (1929) ; accord Martin v. Hadenfeldt, 157 Wash. 563, 289 Pac. 533 (1930).
8 Martin v. Hadenfeldt, supra note 2.
' 41 Wn2d 758, 252 P2d 317 (1953).
aId. at 761, 762, 252 P.2d at 319.
a The dissent argued that although the favored driver owed no duty to the disfavored
driver, "he did owe a duty to himself to protect himself from the negligence of the
disfavored driver."
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Stated abstractly and divorced from the circumstances of a particular
case this principle of reliance on the due care of another is not helpful.
It does not work as a absolute rule of the thumb in determining the
question of liability in intersection cases. The rule has not been applied
to all favored driver cases.
Contributorynegligence as a limitation of the right to rely. The early
case of Breithaupt v. Martin" held that the favored driver proceeding
at a proper speed, on the proper side of the street, had a right to assume
that the disfavored driver would yield the right of way because, having
no notice of the disfavored driver's failure to yield the right of way
until so late that the collision was unavoidable, the favored driver's
failure to see the disfavored driver was immaterial. This was the first
application of the principle to intersection cases under the right of
way statute. The argument that a driver can rely on the exercise of due
care by the other driver was pressed by the disfavored driver in the
next case of Saad v. Langworthy8 but such argument was rejected by
the court by applying a reasonable limitation to the effect that the
reliance on the assumption that the favored driver would not be speeding does not license the driver on the left to "omit any of the care the
law requires of him ... and he is not obsolved from the consequences
of his own contributory negligence. '
The fact that the Saad case involved the right of the disfavored
driver should not make any material difference when the favored driver
invokes the right. While no favored driver case has been found where
the court has used language similar to that of the Saad case, the principle that a favored driver who is himself negligent cannot rely on any
assumption of due care and proper conduct on the part of the disfavored driver has been given approval at least by inference. 0 The
absence of explicit language on this point is best explained by the fact
153 Wash. 192, 279 Pac. 568 (1929).
9 153 Wash. 598, 280 Pac. 74 (1929).
9 Id. at 606, 280 Pac. at 77.
10 For example, see Graham v. Roderick, 32 Wn.2d 427, 202 P.2d 253 (1948) in
which two cars were proceeding in the same direction on an arterial highway. The
forward car swung off the road and then back onto the road in attempting to execute
a "U" turn. The following car travelling 35 miles per hour in a 25 miles per hour zone
did not see the maneuver. The following car's driver in his appellant's brief argued
that it was an intersection case because the forward car had left the intersection and
that he was the favored driver and had a right to rely on an assumption that the disfavored driver would give a proper signal and yield the right of way. The court did
not discuss the reliance point and affirmed the trial court's finding of contributory
negligence. Compare Jamieson v. Taylor, 1 Wn.2d 217, 95 P.2d 791 (1939) where the
favored driver was held to have a right to rely on the assumption that a driver approaching from the opposite direction would give a proper signal and yield the right of way
before attempting to make a left turn.
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that in any case one of the basic questions is whether the favored
driver is guilty of substandard conduct (usually speed) proximately
causing or contributing to the collision." If the facts support a finding
of negligence any dictum regarding "reliance" or refinements thereon
would be merely surplusage. This problem was presented to the court
in the recent case of Sebastian v. Rayment 2 in which the majority of
the department of the court affirmed the trial court's finding of negligence where the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that
the favored driver was speeding and not looking. Justice Donworth, in
dissent, argued that the favored driver had a right to assume that the
right of way would be yielded apparently on the theory that the right
of way is absolute."'
Actual or Imputed Knowledge of the Disfavored Driver's Negligence. A second limitation was placed on a driver's right to assume
that the other driver is exercising due care in the early case of McHugh
v. Mason," where the court stated that the disfavored driver could
assume that the favored driver would not be speeding, unless he had
"actual or imputed knowledge" to the contrary. This limitation is
almost inseparable from the requirement that the favored driver can
not recover if he failed to avail himself of an "opportunity" to avoid
the accident."5 The right of way being relative," too firm an insistance
upon the right is contributory negligence where the favored driver
actually sees the disfavored driver and knows that the driver on the
left is oblivious of the favored driver." Failure to maintain a proper
lookout where there was an opportunity to avoid a collision has been
held contributory negligence in the following cases: where the dis21 Chess v. Reynolds, 189 Wash. 547, 66 P2d 297 (1937) where the favored driver
was speeding and not looking; Bennett v. Karnowsky, 24 Wn.2d 487, 166 P.2d 192
(1946) a driver on an arterial who was speeding and'not looking can not recover;
accord, Whisler v. Weiss, 26 Wn.2d 446, 174 P.2d 766 (1946). In the Bennet case the
court cited with approval a statement from a Wisconsin case "The possession ... [of
the right of way] ... does not of course justify the possessor in plunging ahead regardless of consequences, nor in the failure to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury
to others, but the fact is an important one to be considered in deciding the question of
negligence." Glatz v. Kroeger Bros., 168 Wis. 635, 170 N.W. 934 (1919).
12 42 Wn2d 108, 254 P.2d 456 (1953).
2a Id. at 112, 254 P.2d at 458 (apparently not recognizing the principle that the right
to assume that the right of way will be yielded does not excuse the driver from the
consequences of his own contributory negligence).
1, Supra note 2. "Early case:' is used in reference to the passage of the statute in
1927.
5

' Young v. Smith, 166 Wash. 411, 7 P.2d 1 (1932) (favored driver could have
stopped his car and avoided the accident if he had "looked straight ahead"). Accord,
Stoke v. Paulson 168 Wash. 1, 19 P.2d 247 (1932).
26 Supra note 2.
'17 Ellestad v. Leonard, 18 Wn.2d 118, 138 P.2d 200 (1943).
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favored driver stopped or stalled within the intersection but leaving
ample space for the favored driver to pass;" where the disfavored
driver entered the intersection before the favored driver and the
favored driver could have avoided the impact if he had looked;" and
where on an arterial a disfavored driver attempts to cross in front of
the favored highway driver."
In the recent case of Bos v. Duaudt2 the favored driver was held
liable to a guest passenger on a motor scooter where the moter scooter
turned left onto the road travelled on by the favored driver and where
the favored driver "failed to act promptly after ... negligently failing
to observe the disfavored driver crossing ... the intersection immediately ahead of him . . ."I The court distinguished the Massengale
case 23 on the ground that in the Bos case there was an opportunity to
avoid the collision.
Acts in an Emergency - Lack of opportunity to avoid the Impact.
The co-relative of the rule that the favored driver is contributorily
negligent if he fails to avail himself of an opportunity to avoid the
collision is the situation presented by the Massengale case.2' If the
favored driver without negligence on his own part does not become
aware of the disfavored driver's usurpation of the right of way until
such time as it is too late to avoid the collision,"2 or until he is confronted with an emergency 28 the favored driver cannot be charged with
contributory negligence. This is the situation where the court is most
apt to use the language of reliance on the assumption that the dis18 Butzke v. Hendrickson, 172 Wash 302, 20 P.2d 7 (1933) ; Geitzmauer v. Johnson
161 Wash. 444, 297 Pac. 174 (1931).
19 Supra note 15; accord, Justice v. Lavagetto, 9 Wn.2d 77, 113 P.2d 1025 (1941).
20 McCormick v. Hanneberg, 170 Wash. 133, 15 P2d 939 (1932); Weikert v.
Daniels, 178 Wash. 416, 35 P.2d 22 (1934), Finical v. McDonald, 185 Wash. 121, 52
P.2d 1250 (1936).
2142 Wn.2d 641, 257 P.2d 775 (1953).
22 Id. at 646, 257 P.2d at 778.
28 Supra note 4.
24 Supra note 4.
25 Breighaupt v. Martin, supra note 7; Jamieson v. Taylor supra note 10, Bleiler v.
Wolff, 23 Wn.2d 368, 161 P.2d 145 (1945).
26 One confronted with an emergency not of his own creation cannot be held, to the
exercise of the same degree of care as he would be held if time were allowed within
which to deliberate and choose the safest course. Ritter v. Johnson, 163 Wash. 153, 300
Pac. 518 (1931). The case of Winston v. Bacon, 8 Wn.2d 216, 111 P.2d 764 (1941) was
an obstructed intersection case, the favored driver kept a lookout but watched primarily to his right and did not see the disfavored driver until only a few feet away.
The court held that the emergency rule was applicable and that the favored driver
was not liable where he slammed on his brakes and skidded into the other car. Cf.
Murry v. Banning, 17 Wn.2d 1, 134 P.2d 715; Hook v. Kirby, 175 Wash. 352, 27 P.2d
567 (1933) ; accord, Nystuen v. Spokane County, 194 Wash. 312, 77 P.2d 1002 (1938)
(driver on arterial).
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favored driver will yield the right of way. The use of this language
sometimes obscures the fact that before the emergency rule can come
into operation the party to be relieved by the rule must not have
occasioned the emergency by his own substandard conduct."
Priorityinto the Intersection. The fact that it is the favored driver
that hits the disfavored driver will not necessarily be determinative of
whether there was an opportunity to avoid the collision. In the case
of Warner v. Keebler" plaintiff, the favored driver actually saw the
disfavored driver and momentarily slowed down, but thinking that
the disfavored driver also was slowing down plaintiff looked ahead,
released his brake and went headlong into the other car. Findings of
fact against the favored driver were reversed in an unanimous departmental opinion. When the disfavored car suddenly crosses the path
of the favored car it becomes a question of fact whether the favored
driver should have seen the disfavored car in time to avoid the collision,2 9 or whether the favored driver was justified in relying on the
assumption that the right of way would be yielded until too late to
avoid the impact.8 0 On the other hand there is some authority to the
effect that even though the disfavored driver hits the favored driver
the latter may be guilty of negligence and may be liable to a guest in
the disfavored car." But in view of the reliance aspect in the
Massengale case it appears that liability would only .be imposed in this
situation if the favored driver was speeding.
Duty to Look to the Left--Conclusion. The favored driver who is
proceeding at a proper speed with his car under control does not have
a "primary duty" to keep a lookout for cars approaching from the
left. Failure to keep a lookout is not negligence that will defeat
recovery as a matter of law. On the other hand it is well settled that
if the disfavored driver does not keep a reasonable and proper lookout
Ritter v. Johnson, supra note 26; cf. Sebastion v. Rayment, supra note 13.
28 200 Wash. 608, 94 P.2d 175 (1939) ; cf. Winston v. Bacon supra note 26.
20 See cases noted at 15, 18, 19 and 20 supra.
30 See cases noted at 24, 25, and 26 supra.
31 Gaskil v. Amadon, 179 Wash. 375, 38 P2d 229 (1934). Verdict for plaintiff guest
was affirmed in holding that it was a question for the jury whether had the favored
driver looked to the left he would have seen the disfavored driver "proceeding wildly
into the intersection." Four judges dissenting argued that as a matter of law the favored
driver could not be charged with negligence where he had a right to assume (1) that
the disfavored driver would yield the right of way (Breithaup v. Martin, supra note
7) and (2) that the disfavored driver would not be speeding (Pearson v. Adams Company, 154 Wash. 630, 283 Pac. 194 (1929). It is this writer's opinion that on the basis
of the Massengale case the Gaskil case is no longer authoritative in this state.
27
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he is guilty of negligence as a matter of law.8" This difference is
explained simply because it is the statutory duty of the disfavored
driver to lookout for and yield the right of way to favored drivers. It is
the duty of the favored driver to avoid a collision if by the exercise
of reasonable care he could have avoided it. Reasonable care of the
favored driver, with respect to a duty to keep a lookout, appears to be
a slight departure from the common law rules. It is the standard of
conduct of a hypothetical reasonably prudent driver who is conscious
of his statutory right of way and who has the privilege to rely on that
right. In the normal case where the facts are in dispute, it will be a
question for the jury whether the failure of the favored driver to see
the disfavored driver deprived him of an opportunity to avoid the
accident."8

12 Hoeing v. Kohl, 182 Wash. 245, 46 P.2d 728 (1935); Delsman v. Bertolli, 200
Wash. 380, 93 P.2d 371 (1939) ; Dept. of Labor and Industries v. Hickle, 1 Wn2d 475,
96 P.2d 577 (1939) ; Calvert v. City of Seattle, 23 Wn.2d 817, 162 P.2d 441 (1945).
Contrast McLean v. Continental Bakery Co., 9 Wn.2d 176, 114 P.2d 159 (1941) where
the favored driver looked but did not see the disfavored driver-findings of fact in
favor of the favored driver affirmed in a five to four opinion.
88 Contrast these instructions to the jury: (1) "If you find from the evidence that the
favored driver saw or should have seen the disfavored driver after it became apparent
that the disfavored driver was intending to cross the intersection, in time by the exercise
of ordinary care to avoided a collision therewith, then I instruct you that the favored
driver would be liable" with (2) "If you find from the evidence of this case that the
favored driver by the exercise of a reasonable lookout could have seen that the disfavored driver was crossing in front of him in time to have stopped or slowed his car
so as to have prevented the collision, and that the favored driver failed so to do and
that such failure on his part caused or contributed to the collision, the favored driver
cannot recover." Instruction (1) was held error in Huber v. Hemrick Brewing Co.,
188 Wash. 235, 62 P.2d 451 (1936) as an erroneous statement of last clear chance.
Instruction (2) held proper in Weikert v. Daniels, supra note 20. For a review of the
doctrine of last clear chance in Washington, see Notes, 8 WAsH. L. REv. 145 (1934)
and 27 WAsH. L. REv. 158 (1952). Cf. Warren v. Hynes, 4 Wn.2d 128, 102 P.2d 691
(1940) where the disfavored driver struck the favored driver. The favored driver had
looked to his left when he was 150 feet from the intersection and there was nothing in
sight. Whether the favored driver should have taken a second look the court said was
a question for the jury in a situation where there was conflicting evidence of the speed
of both cars.

